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1 Introduction
Starting with Court (1941), Griliches (1961) and Lancaster (1966), a large
literature has aimed at providing a theoretical framework for pricing the
attributes of highly differentiated goods. While this literature was initially
mainly empirical in nature and early contributions lacked a proper theoretical
setting, the first theoretical treatments of hedonic models appeared in Tinber-
gen (1956) and Rosen (1974). Tinbergen (1956) presents a stylized model in
which preferences are quadratic and attributes normally distributed. Rosen
(1974) showed the theoretical relation of hedonic prices to marginal willing-
ness to produce and marginal willingness to consume. Hedonic models have
also been used to study the pricing of highly differentiated products such as
houses (Kain and Quigley, 1970), wine and champagne (Golan and Shalit,
1993), automobiles quality (Triplett, 1969) among others but also set forth a
new literature on the Value of Statistical Life following Thaler and Rosen’s
(1976) original idea of seeing jobs attributes and in particular “risk taken
on the job” as a vector of hedonic attributes valued on the labor market.
More recently, significant progress on the understanding of the properties of
hedonic models (properties of an equilibrium, identification of deep parame-
ters etc.) has been achieved. These developments are to a large extent due
to Ivar Ekeland’s contributions, see e.g. Ekeland et al. (2004) and Ekeland
(2010), and it is a pleasure to dedicate to him the present piece of work in
recognition of our intellectual debt for him.
In this paper we contribute to the hedonic literature in two ways. First,
we elaborate on an idea of Maurice Queyranne who reformulated the hedonic
model in the discrete case as a network flow problem. This reformulation al-
lows us to derive results on existence of a hedonic equilibrium in the discrete
case, and it allows the use of powerful computational techniques to solve for
the equilibrium. Second, building on recent development in the matching
model literature and in particular the seminal contribution due to Choo and
Siow (2006) generalized by Galichon and Salanie´ (2014), we introduce het-
erogeneities (unobserved by the econometrician) in producer and consumer
types. This formalism has two advantages: (i) it allows for the incorporation
of unobserved heterogeneity in the producers and consumers characteristics,
and (ii) it provides straightforward identification results. Indeed, we follow
Galichon and Salanie´ in making use of the convex duality in discrete choice
problems to recover utilities from choice probabilities on both side of the
market.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses
the properties of an equilibrium in hedonic model and its reformulation as
a network flow problem. Section 3 introduces a model with unobserved het-
erogeneities on both sides of the market and studies the identification of
preference parameters. The discussion in Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Equilibrium, existence and properties
2.1 Hedonic equilibrium
The model. Throughout this paper, X is the set of observable types of
producers of a given good, and Y the set of observable types of consumers
of that good. This good comes in various qualities; let Z be the set of the
good’s qualities. The sets X , Y and Z are assumed to be finite. It is assumed
that there is a supply nx (resp. my) of producers (resp. consumers) of type
x (resp. y). It is assumed that producers (resp. consumers) can produce
(consume) at most one unit of good. They have the option not to participate
in the market, in which case they choose z = 0.
For example, hedonic models can be used to model the market for fine
wines1. In that case, X may be the set of observable characteristics of wine
producers (say, grapes used, average amount of sunshine, and harvesting
technology), and Y may be the set of observable characteristics of wine con-
sumers (say country and purchasing channel). Z will be the quality of the
wine (say acidity, sugar content, expert rating).
Let pz be the price of the good of quality z. If a producer of type x
produces the good in quality z, the payoff to the producer is αxz + pz, where
αxz ∈ R∪{−∞} is the producer’s productivity (the opposite of a production
cost). Similarly, if the consumer of type y consumes the good in quality z,
the payoff to the consumer is γyz − pz, where γyz ∈ R ∪ {−∞} is the utility
of the consumer2. Producers and consumers who do not participate in the
market get a surplus of zero.
1We are confident Ivar will approve of this choice of example.
2Note that in this setup, the utility of agents on each side of the market does not
depend directly on the type of the agent with whom they match, only through the type
of the contract. A more general framework where α and γ depend simultaneously on x, y
and z is investigated in Dupuy, Galichon and Zhao (2014).
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Supply and demand. Let µxz be the supply function, that is the num-
ber of producers of type x offering quality z; similarly, µzy is the demand
function, the number of consumers of type y demanding quality z. One has∑
z∈Z
µxz ≤ nx ,
∑
z∈Z
µzy ≤ my
where the difference between the right-hand side and the left-hand side of
these inequalities is the number of producers of type x (resp. consumers of
type y) deciding to opt out of the market. The market clearing condition for
quality z expresses that the total quantity of good of quality z produced is
equal to the total quantity consumed, that is∑
x∈X
µxz =
∑
y∈Y
µzy
(it is assumed that there is no free disposal; if free disposal is assumed the
equality is replaced by ≥ in the expression).
Equilibrium prices. At equilibrium, each producer x will optimize its
production behavior given the price vector (pz); hence if producing quality z
′
yields strictly more profit than producing quality z, then quality z will not
be produced at all; that is αxz + pz < αxz′ + pz′ for some z
′ implies µxz = 0.
A similar condition holds for consumers.
One can now state a formal definition.
Definition 2.1 (Hedonic equilibrium). Let (pz)z∈Z be a price vector, µxz a
supply function, and µyz a demand function. Then:
(a) (p, µ) is called a hedonic equilibrium whenever the following three
conditions are all verified:
(i) People counting: the number of producers of type x actually partici-
pating in the market does not exceed the total number of agents of type x,
and similarly for consumers of type y. That is, for any x and y,∑
z
µxz ≤ nx ,
∑
z
µzy ≤ my. (2.1)
(ii) Market clearing: for any z, supply for quality z will equate demand,
that is ∑
x∈X
µxz =
∑
y∈Y
µzy. (2.2)
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(iii) Rationality: no producer or consumer chooses a quality that is sub-
optimal. That is, given (x, y, z, z′), then
αxz + pz < αxz′ + pz′ implies µxz = 0
γyz − pz < γyz′ − pz′ implies µyz = 0.
(b) If nx and my are integer, (p, µ) is called an integral equilibrium when-
ever (p, µ) is a hedonic equilibrium and all the entries µ are integers.
The indirect utility ux of a producer of type x and the indirect utility vy of
a consumer of type y are given by ux = Gx (αx. + p.) and vy = Hy (γ.y − p.),
where G and H are respectively the indirect surpluses of producers and con-
sumers, defined by
Gx (Ux.) = max
z
U+xz and Hy (V.y) = max
z
V +yz (2.3)
where a+ denotes the positive part of a.
As a result, if pz is an equilibrium price, then for all x, y and z, ux ≥
αxz + pz and vy ≥ γzy − pz, thus γyz − vy ≤ pz ≤ ux − αxz. Therefore:
Proposition 2.1. For a given optimal solution u and v, the set of equilibrium
prices are the prices pz such that
pmaxz ≥ pz ≥ pminz . (2.4)
where
pminz = max
y
(γyz − vy) and pmaxz = min
x
(ux − αxz) . (2.5)
As a result, ux + vy ≥ αxz + γyz, hence
ux + vy ≥ max
z
(αxz + γyz) , (2.6)
thus, as observed by Chiappori, McCann and Nesheim (2010), u and v are
the stable payoffs of the assignment game in transferable utility with surplus
Φxy = maxz (αxz + γyz). In the next paragraph, we shall go beyond this
equivalence by seeing a reformulation of the hedonic model as a network flow
problem.
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2.2 Network flow formulation
Interestingly, as understood by Maurice Queyranne, the hedonic equilibrium
problem can be reformulated as a network flow problem. This reformulation
will be of particular interest since, as we show below, it help us establish
the existence of a hedonic equilibrium and provides the building blocks to
compute an equilibrium. While the present exposition is as self-contained as
possible, a good reference for network flow problems is Ahuja, Magnanti and
Orlin (1993).
The network. Define a set of nodes by N = X ∪Z∪Y , and a set of arcs
A which is a subset of N ×N and is such that if ww′ ∈ A, then w′w /∈ A.
Here, the set of arcs is A = (X × Z) ∪ (Y × Z).
A vector is defined as an element of RA. Here, we introduce the following
direct surplus vector
φww′ : = αxz if w = x and w
′ = z (2.7a)
φww′ : = γyz if w = z and w
′ = y. (2.7b)
For two nodes w and w′, a path from w to w′ is a chain
(w0w1), (w1w2), ..., (wT−2wT−1), (wT−1wT )
such that wiwi+1 ∈ A for each i. T is the length of the path. Here, the only
nontrivial paths are of length 2 and are of the form (xz) , (zy) where x ∈ X ,
z ∈ Z and y ∈ Y .
For two nodes w and w′, we define the reduced surplus, or indirect surplus
as the surplus associated to the optimal path from w to w′. Here, for x ∈ X ,
y ∈ Y , the indirect suplus Φxy of producer x and consumer y is
Φxy := max
z∈Z
(αxz + γyz) . (2.8)
For w ∈ N , we let Nw be the algebraic quantity of mass leaving the
network at w. Hence Nw is the flow of mass being consumed (Nw > 0) or
produced (Nw < 0) at w. The nodes such that Nw < 0 (resp. Nw = 0
and Nw > 0) are called the source nodes, whose set is denoted S (resp.
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intermediate nodes I and target nodes T ). Here, for x ∈ X , y ∈ Y , and
z ∈ Z, we set
Nx := −nx , Ny := my , Nz := 0 (2.9)
so that the set of source nodes is S := X , the set of intermediate nodes is
I := Z, and the set of target nodes is T := Y .
Gradient, flows. We define a potential as an element of RN . We define
the gradient matrix as the matrix of general term ∇aw, a ∈ A, w ∈ N such
that
∇aw = −1 if a is out of w, ∇aw = 1 if a is into w, ∇aw = 0 else,
so that, for a potential f ∈ RN , ∇f is the vector such that for a = ww′ ∈ A,
one has (∇f)ww′ = fw′ − fw. Here, set the potential of surpluses U as
Ux := −ux , Uz := −pz , Uy := vy, (2.10)
and
(∇U)xz = ux − pz and (∇U)zy = vy + pz. (2.11)
We define the divergence matrix ∇∗ (sometimes also called node-edge, or
incidence matrix 3) as the transpose of the gradient matrix: ∇∗xa := ∇ax. As
a result, for a vector v,
(∇∗v)ww′ =
∑
z
vzw′ −
∑
z
vwz.
A flow is a nonnegative vector µ ∈ RA+ that satisfies the balance of mass
equation4, that is
(N −∇∗µ)w ≥ 0, w ∈ S (2.12)
(N −∇∗µ)w = 0, w ∈ I (2.13)
(N −∇∗µ)w ≤ 0, w ∈ T (2.14)
3The node-edge matrix is usually denoted A; our notations ∇∗ and terminology are
chosen to stress the analogy with the corresponding differential operators in the continuous
case.
4In most physical systems, mass is conserved and the balance equation has the more
usual form of Kirchoff’s law ∇∗µ = N . However, in the present setting, producers and
consumers have an option not to participate in the market, hence ∇∗µ = N is replaced
by Eqs. (2.12)-(2.14).
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Here, µ : (µxz, µzy) is a flow if and only if µxz and µzy satisfy the people
counting and market clearing equations, that is∑
z
µxz ≤ nx ,
∑
z
µzy ≤ my and
∑
x∈X
µxz =
∑
y∈Y
µzy.
Maximum surplus flow. We now consider the maximum surplus flow problem,
that is
max
µ∈RA+
∑
a∈A
µaφa (2.15)
s.t. µ satisfies (2.12), (2.13), (2.14),
whose value coincides with the value of its dual version, that is
min
U∈RN
∑
w∈N
UwNw (2.16)
s.t. Uw ≥ 0, ∀w ∈ S ∪ T
∇U ≥ φ,
and by complementary slackness, for w ∈ S ∪ T , Uw > 0 implies Nw =
(∇∗µ)w. A standard result is that if N has only integral entries, then (2.15)
has an integral solution µ.
Here the solution U of (2.16) is related to the solution to the hedonic
model by Equations (2.10), that is ux = −Ux , pz = −Uz , vy = Uy. Using
(2.11) and (2.7), ∇U ≥ φ implies ux − pz = Uz − Ux ≥ φxz = αxz and
vy + pz = Uy − Uz ≥ φzy = γzy, thus, using complementary slackness one
recovers
ux = max
z
(αxz + pz)
+ and vy = max
z
(γzy − pz)+ .
Further, if n and m have only integral entries, then there is an integral
solution µ to (2.15). Therefore:
Theorem 2.1 (Queyranne). The hedonic equilibrium problem of Theorem
2.2 can be reformulated as a matching flow problem as described above.
As announced above, this reformulation has several advantages. First, it
establishes the existence of a hedonic equilibrium, and its integrality.
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Theorem 2.2 (Existence). Consider a market given by nx producers of type
x, my consumers of type y, and where productivity of producer x is given by
αxz, and utility of consumer y is γyz.Then:
(i) There exists a hedonic equilibrium (pz, µxz, µyz);
(ii) (µxz, µyz) are solution to the primal problem of the expression of the
social welfare
max
µxz ,µyz≥0
∑
xz
µxzαxz +
∑
yz
µyzγyz (2.17)∑
z
µxz ≤ nx and
∑
z
µyz ≤ my and
∑
x
µxz =
∑
y
µyz,
while (pz) is obtained from the solution of the dual expression of the social
welfare
min
ux,vy≥0;pz
∑
x
nxux +
∑
y
myvy (2.18)
ux ≥ αxz + pz and vy ≥ γyz − pz.
expressed equivalently as minpz
∑
x nxGx (αx. + p.)+
∑
ymyHy (γ.y − p.), where
the indirect surpluses Gx and Hy are defined in (2.3).
(iii) If nx and my are integral for each x and y, then µxz and µyz can be
taken integral.
Second, on the practical side, Theorem 2.2 also has a useful consequence in
terms of computation of the equilibrium, as shown in the following corollary.
Corollary 2.1. The equilibrium prices (pz) as well as the quantities µxz, µyz
supplied at equilibrium can be determined using one of the many maximum
flows algorithms, see for instance Ahuja, Magnanti and Orlin (1993).
Example 2.1. Assume that there are four sellers and three buyers, each
of whom is unique among her type, and three qualities. Participation is
endogenous but there is no free disposal. Assume that the technology and
preference parameters are given by
(αxz) =

2 5 3
2 1 4
1 5 8
4 2 4
 and (γyz) =
 0 2 42 4 2
1 2 6
 .
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The indirect utilities of the buyers and the sellers are determined by linear
programming. One finds uminx = (0 0 4 0) and v
max
y = (8 9 10), and u
max
x =
(3 0 4 0), and vminy = (8 6 10), and the optimal matching will consist in
matching x1 with y2, which produce together quality 2, and any other two
remaining producers with the two other remaining consumers, producing two
units of quality of quality 3. Hence the optimal production of quality is lx1 =
0, lx2 = 1 and lx3 = 2. Making use of p
min
z = maxy
(
γyz − vmaxy
)
and pmaxz =
minx (u
max
x − αxz) ,one finds that if u = (0 0 4 0) and v = (8 9 10), then
p ∈ [−7,−4]× [−5,−2]× {−4}.
3 Introducing heterogeneities
In the spirit of Galichon and Salanie´ (2014), who extended the model of
Choo and Siow (2006), we are now going to introduce heterogeneities in
producers’ and consumers’ characteristics. As before, we consider the set X
of observable types of producers, the set Y of observable types of consumers,
and Z be the set of qualities, and the sets X , Y and Z are finite5. In the
sequel, i will denote an individual producer, and j will denote an individual
consumer. The analyst observes the “observable type” xi ∈ X of producer
i, and the “observable type” yj ∈ Y of consumer j. Two producers (resp.
consumers) sharing the same observable type may differ in some additional
heterogeneity term that will affect their profitability (resp. utility) function.
This heterogeneity is observed by the consumers but not by the analyst. It
is assumed that the quality z ∈ Z is fully observable by all parties and the
analyst.
If the price of quality z is pz, then the profit of an individual producer
i selling quality z is defined as α˜iz + pz ∈ R ∪ {−∞}, and the utility of an
individual consumer j purchasing z is defined as γ˜jz − pz ∈ R ∪ {−∞}. If
producer i (resp. consumer j) does not participate in the market, she gets a
surplus of α˜i0 (resp. γ˜j0). The tilde notation in α˜ and γ˜ indicates that these
terms characterize the invididual level, which will be random from the point
of view of the observer. Note that the utility of agents on each side of the
5However, the ideas presented here extend to the continuous case, see Dupuy and
Galichon (2014) for a continuous logit approach and Chernozhukov, Galichon and Henry
(2014) for an approach based on multivariate quantile maps.
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market still does not depend directly on the type of the agent with whom
they match, but only indirectly via the type of the contract.
3.1 Structure of the heterogeneity
We introduce an structural assumption regarding the structure of unobserved
heterogeneity.
Assumption 3.1. Assume that the pre-transfer profitability and utility terms
have structure
α˜iz = αxiz + εiz and γ˜jz = γyjz + ηjz
α˜i0 = εi0 and γ˜j0 = ηj0
where:
a) The surplus shock, or unobserved heterogeneity component εi of all pro-
ducers of observable characteristics xi are drawn from the same distribution
Pxi.
b) The surplus shock, or unobserved heterogeneity component ηj of all con-
sumers of observable characteristics yj are drawn from the same distribution
Qyj .
c) The distributions P and Q have full support.
Part a) and b) of this assumption are not very restrictive. They essentially
express that the quality z is fully observed. Part c) is more restrictive. It
implies that for each type of producer or consumer, and for any quality, some
individual of this type will produce or consume this quality. This assumption
does not hold if, say, some technological constraint prevents some producers
to produce a given quality. Although this assumption is not required, and is
not needed in Galichon and Salanie´ (2014), it greatly simplifies the results
on identification and we will maintain it for the purposes of this paper.
We will also assume that:
Assumption 3.2. There is a large number of producers and consumers of
each given observable type, and each of them are price takers.
This assumption has two virtues. First, it implies that we can have a
statistical description of the producers and the consumer of a given type
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and we do not need to worry about sample variations. Second, it rules out
any strategic behaviour by agents: the market here is assumed perfectly
competitive.
3.2 Social welfare
We now investigate the social welfare, understood as the sum of the produc-
ers’ and consumers’ surpluses. We first focus on the side of producers. At
equilibrium, producer i will get utility
Uxiz + εiz
from producing quality z, where
Uxz = αxz + pz.
The sum of the ex-ante indirect surpluses of the producers of observ-
able type x is nxGx(Ux·), where Gx(Ux·) is the expected indirect utility of a
consumer of type x, that is
Gx(Ux·) = EPx
[
max
z∈Z
(Uxz + εiz, εi0)
]
(3.1)
where Ux· denotes the vector of (Uxz)z∈Z , and where the expectation is taken
with respect to the distribution Px of unobserved heterogeneity component
εi. By the Envelope theorem, the number of producers of type x choosing
quality z, denoted µz|x, is given by
µz|x =
µxz
nx
= Px (x chooses z)
=
∂Gx(Ux.)
∂Uxz
. (3.2)
This result sheds light on the equilibrium characterization problem: based
on the vector of producer surpluses U , this allows to deduce the production
patterns µ, and a similar picture holds on the consumers’ side. However,
the identification problem consists in recovering utility parameters, here Ux·
based on the observation of producer’ choices, here summarized by µxz, the
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number of producers of observable type x who choose to sell quality z. This
requires inverting relation (3.2). To do this, still following Galichon and
Salanie´ (2014), introduce the Legendre-Fenchel transform G∗x of Gx as
G∗x(µ.|x) = max
Uxz
(∑
z∈Z
µz|xUxz −Gx(Ux.)
)
if
∑
z∈Z
µz|x ≤ 1 (3.3)
= +∞ otherwise.
where µ.|x is the vector of choice probabilities
(
µz|x
)
z∈Z . By the Envelope
theorem, one has
Uxz =
∂G∗x(µz|x)
∂µz|x
. (3.4)
Hence Uxz is identified from µx.by equation (3.4). Galichon and Salanie´
(2014) have shown that G∗ can be very efficiently computed as the solution
to an optimal matching problem.
Similarly to the producers’ side of the market, denote Vyz = γyz − pz the
deterministic part of the consumer’s payoff from buying good quality z, and
write Vy· for the |Z|-dimensional vector with z-th component Vyz. The sum
of expected utilities of consumers with observable characteristics y is given
by myHy(Vy.), where Hy(Vy.) is the expected indirect utility of a consumer
of type y, that is
Hy(Vy.) = EQy
[
max
z∈Z
(Vyz + ηyz, ηy0)
]
,
and Qy is the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity component ηj for
a consumer indexed by j, with observable characteristics y = yj. Hence, as
in the producer’s case, we obtain identification of Vyz through the following
relation.
Vyz =
∂H∗y (µ.|y)
∂µz|y
, (3.5)
where H∗y is the convex conjugate of Hy, defined by a formula similar to (3.3).
Recall that the social welfare W is the sum of the producers and con-
sumers surpluses. We are now able to state the following result.
13
Theorem 3.1. (i) The optimal social welfare in this economy is given by
W = min
pz
∑
x∈X
nxGx (αx. + p.) +
∑
y∈Y
myHy (γy. − p.) . (3.6)
(ii) Alternatively, W can be expressed as
W = max
µ≥0
∑
x∈X ,z∈Z
µxzαxz +
∑
y∈Y,z∈Z
µyzγyz − E (µ) (3.7)
s.t. µ satisfies (2.1) and (2.2),
where E(µ) is a generalized entropy function, defined by
E(µ) =
∑
x∈X
nxG
∗
x (µx.) +
∑
y∈Y
myH
∗
y (µy.) .
(iii) Further the equilibrium (pz, µxz, µyz) is unique and is such that (pz)
is a minimizer for (3.6) and (µxz, µyz) is a maximizer for (3.7).
The terminology “generalized entropy” comes from the fact, that in the
Logit case where the utility shocks ε and η are i.i.d. and have a Gumbel
distribution, then E(µ) is a regular entropy function, namely
E(µ) =
∑
x∈X , y∈Y
µxy log
µ2xy
nxmy
+
∑
x∈X
µxy log
µx0
nx
+
∑
y∈Y
µxy log
µ0y
my
where µx0 = nx −
∑
y∈Y µxy and µ0y = my −
∑
x∈X µxy.
3.3 Identification
As a result of the first order conditions in the previous theorem, the model
is exactly identified from the observation of the hedonic prices pz, along with
the production and consumption patterns µxz and µyz.
Theorem 3.2. The producers and consumers systematic surpluses at equi-
librium U and V are identified from µxz and µyz by
Uxz =
∂G∗x(µ)
∂µx|z
and Vyz =
∂H∗y (µ)
∂µy|z
.
Hence α and γ are identified from µxz, µyz and pz by
αxz =
∂G∗x(µ)
∂µx|z
− pz and γyz =
∂H∗y (µ)
∂µy|z
+ pz.
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4 Discussion
The results presented in this paper are applicable to many different empirical
settings. Returning to the market for fine wines for example, the analyst will
typically have access to data about the share of consumers with observable
characteristics y purchasing wine of quality z and the share of producers of
type x selling wine of quality z. Our methodology allows to identify the
surpluses of consumers and producers from these data. If in addition, the
price of wine of various qualities are observed, then the utility α of consumers
and technology γ of producers are identified as well.
Next, consider the marriage market example. In classical models of sort-
ing on the marriage market, following Becker (1973) and Shapley and Shubik
(1972), the matching surplus between a man of type x and a woman of type
y is
Φxy = αxy + γxy
where α and γ are the man and the woman’s surplus for being married to
eachother. However, this analysis misses the fact that the partners in the
marriage market also need to make a number of joint decisions, such as
whether/when/how to raise children, where to live, how to spend their spare
time together, etc. This has the flavour of a hedonic model. For the sake of
discussion, consider (on the other extreme) a framework where the observed
characteristics is, say, the date of birth of each agent, and where the only
variable agents care about is, say, the date of birth of their first child. In this
context, the matching surplus is now
Φxy = sup
z
(αxz + γyz)
and the methodology developed in this paper can identify the surplus of a
man born in x = 1985 to have his first child in say z = 2012 and the surplus
of a woman born in y = 1986 to have her first child in z = 2013. The required
data are the shares of men and women born in a given year who had their
first child in a given year. This example, however, is peculiar as men and
women are likely to form preferences not only over the hedonic attribute z,
i.e. the year of birth of first child, but also over their spouse’s attributes x
and y. One therefore needs to consider a model encompassing the hedonic
model a la Rosen (1974) with the sorting model a` la Becker (1973). In this
model, developed and studied in Dupuy and Galichon and Zhao (2014) who
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apply it to the study of migration in China, the matching surplus is
Φxy = sup
z
(αxyz + γxyz)
and this model embeds both the classical sorting model (αxyz = αxy and
γxyz = γxy) and the hedonic model (αxyz = αxz and γxyz = γyz). The
empirically interesting question there is to assess which of the “sorting effect”
or “hedonic effect” is strongest.
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